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I. INTRODUCTION 
In this Article, I undertake a very preliminary inquiry into some 
aspects of the concept of harm. My excuse for doing so in a symposium 
on compensation is that, in private law and particularly in tort law, an 
award of damages is often intended to compensate for harm; if we do not 
know something about the nature of harm, we cannot fully understand 
the nature of at least this type of compensation. To avoid one possible 
source of confusion, I should add immediately that harm is not the only 
thing that can be compensated by an award of compensatory damages. 
Compensation in law is generally meant to rectify a setback to an 
* Fiorello La Guardia Professor of Law and Professor of Philosophy, New York 
University School of Law. I am grateful for very insightful responses to an earlier 
version of this Article by John Goldberg at the symposium on compensation held at the 
University of San Diego in February 2003 and by Andrew Simester at the Oxford 
Jurisprudence Colloquium held at Oxford in March 2003. I also benefited a great deal 
from the comments of other participants on both occasions. Because I was able to revise 
the Article for publication in only the most limited way, I have unfortunately not been 
able to discuss many of the points raised by Goldberg, Simester, and others. I hope to do 
so in future work. 
1 283 
interest, but, I shall argue, while all instances of harm are setbacks to 
interests, not all setbacks to interests are instances of harm. Further, in 
cases where the law imposes liability for omissions-that is, for 
breaching an affirmative duty to put someone in a certain position-it 
may be that the term "compensation" is appropriate even if the person 
being compensated has not suffered any setback, in the sense of an 
historical worsening, at all. However, nothing that I have to say about 
harm will turn on accepting one account rather than another of the 
concept of compensation. 
To avoid one other possible source of confusion, I should also 
emphasize at the outset that my inquiry is into the nature of harm and not 
into the nature of causation. I shall argue that an instance of harm is not 
simply a certain kind of condition or state of being, but rather must have 
been brought about by a causal process. While causation and harm are 
obviously distinct concepts, it might be thought that, because harm is the 
result of a causal process, one's analysis of causation must carry over to 
one's analysis of harm. If causation is properly analyzable in counterfactual 
terms, for example, it might be thought that the same must be true of 
harm.
1 
That, however, would be a mistake. To ask what it means to say 
that event A caused event B is one question; to ask what it means to say 
that event B is harmful is another. 
In Part II, taking a seminal article by Joel Feinberg as my starting 
point,2 I consider two possible characterizations of harm. Both treat 
harm as a setback to an interest and as involving a comparison between 
two states of affairs , but one supposes that the relevant comparison is 
based on a counterfactual inquiry, while the other supposes that it is 
based on an historical inquiry. I argue that the historical characterization 
is the preferable one. In Part III, I consider a critique offered by Seana 
Shiffrin of comparative accounts of harm in general.3 In Part IV, I try to 
say something further about the relationship among harm, interests, 
and rights. Finally, in Part V, I present some considerations in favor of 
the view that even though harm should be characterized historically, 
compensation for harm in tort should often be determined counterfactually, 
by reference to what would have happened had the tort not occurred. 
I. Michael Moore very persuasively cntlc1zes the counterfactual analysis of 
causation in Michael Moore, For What Must We Pay? Causation and Counterfactual 
Baselines, 40 SAN DI EGO L. REV. 1181 (2003). 
2. JOEL FEINBERG, Wrongful Life and the Counterfactual Element in Harming, in 
FREEDOM AND FULFILLM ENT 3 ( 1992). 
3. Seana Valentine Shiffrin, Wrongful Life, Procreative Responsibility, and the 
Significance of Harm, 5 LEGAL THEORY 117 ( 1999). 
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II. HARM, COUNTERFACTUALS, AND HISTORICAL WORSENING 
Speaking of "harm" in the sense that he takes to be presupposed by the 
harm principle and, more generally, to be of interest to the civil and 
criminal law, Joel Feinberg offers the following analysis: 
A harms B in the relevant sense if and only if: 
1. A acts (in a sense wide enough to include omissions and extended sequences 
of activity). 
2. A' s action is defective or faulty with respect to the risks it creates to B, that 
is, it is done either with the intention of producing the consequences for B 
that follow, or similarly adverse ones, or with negligence or recklessness in 
respect to those consequences. 
3. A's acting in that manner is indefensible, that is, neither excusable nor 
justifiable. 
4. A's action is the cause of an adverse effect on B's self-interest (a "state of 
harm"). 4 5. A's action is also a violation of B's right. 
Feinberg notes in a footnote that condition 5 might, given conditions 3 
and 4, be redundant. A more important point, however, concerns whether 
or not conditions 2, 3, and 5 are appropriately included as necessary 
conditions at all in the analysis. Feinberg is clearly analyzing the notion 
of a harm in moral terms, and he is right to do so. This is true if for no 
other reason than that condition 4, which I take to be the heart of the 
analysis, requires that A's act have an adverse effect on B' s self-interest. 
Determining what constitutes a person's  self-interest, as well as 
determining what effects on self-interest should count as adverse, clearly 
involves substantive moral argument. However, the fact that the analysis of 
"A harms B" is at least partially moral in character does not entail that 
A's harming act must have been, say, faulty or defective (condition 2). 
Even if we follow Feinberg and restrict our attention to harms that might 
be of concern to the law, insisting on conditions 2, 3 ,  and 5 clearly 
leaves out of account the possibility of certain theoretical approaches to 
tort law in particular; condition 2, for example, is incompatible with 
strict liability. Perhaps strict liability is not in the end a defensible 
theory of recovery in tort, but that is a substantive conclusion, and it 
needs to be defended in substantive terms; in the absence of such 
argument, Feinberg's analysis begs an important question. Intuitively, it 
seems clear that if A acts and thereby adversely affects B' s self-interest, 
she has harmed B, whether or not she acted faultily or violated one of 
4 .  FEINBERG, supra note 2, at 6. 
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B' s rights. Fault or a rights violation may well be a necessary condition 
of moral blameworthiness on A's part, or of her civil or criminal liability 
at law, but there does not seem to be any basis for saying that in their 
absence A did not, in fact, harm B. 
In this Article, I shall therefore focus on Feinberg's conditions 1 and 
4. It should be noted that condition 4 speaks of an adverse effect on "B' s 
self-interest," as though B has just one interest at stake. The reason 
Feinberg phrases the point this way would appear to be the following. 
Although he states earlier in his article that "[t]he term 'interests' is best 
left undefined here, except to say that interests are distinguishable 
components of a person's good or well-being,"5 he immediately goes on 
to say that "our concepts seem to commit us to the view that interests 
can be summed up or integrated into one emergent personal interest."6 
This last point, however, is far from evident, and in Part IV, I shall argue 
that it is mistaken. Condition 2 should therefore be reformulated to 
speak simply of an adverse effect on "one of B' s interests" rather than on 
"B' s self-interest." 
This brings us to a crucial point, which is that, in Feinberg' s  view, the 
analysis of "A harms B" as thus far presented is incomplete. We also 
need, as an independent requirement for the occurrence of harm, the so­
called counterfactual condition: 
6 .  B's personal interest is in a worse condition (usually but not always lower on 
the interest graph) than it would be in had A not acted as he did.7 
Feinberg distinguishes the counterfactual test from the worsening test, 
which is not, he says, always required for an act of harming. The 
worsening test can be expressed as follows: 
6X. B's personal interest is in a worse condition (lower on the interest graph) 
than it was before A acted. 8 
For purposes of clarity, I will refer to what Feinberg calls the 
worsening test as the "historical worsening test." As Feinberg notes, the 
counterfactual test and the historical worsening test do not amount to the 
same thing. Feinberg does not use this kind of example, but consider an 
instance of concurrent causation, such as occurred in the famous case of 
Kingston v. Chicago & Northwestern Railway Co. :9 Two separately 
started fires joined and burned down the plaintiff's house, where either 
5. !d. at 4. 
6. !d. 
7. !d. at 7 .  
8. !d. 
9. 2 1 1  N.W. 913 (Wis. 1 927). 
1 286 
[VOL. 40: 1 283, 2003] Harm, History, and Counteifactuals 
SAN D IEGO LAW REVIEW 
fire would have been sufficient by itself to bring about that result.10 
Suppose A started one of the fires. Assuming (as seems inevitable) that 
both fires are causes of the house burning down, A causally contributed 
to the histmical worsening of B' s interest in his house. (For present 
purposes, we do not need to specify exactly what the nature of that 
interest is.) The historical worsening test is thus satisfied. But the 
counterfactual test is not satisfied, because the house would have been 
burned down anyway by the other fire. Since Feinberg makes the 
counterfactual test rather than the historical worsening test the touchstone 
of harm, it would seem that, on Feinberg's view, A has not harmed B. 
Feinberg uses the following example to show that the counterfactual 
test can be satisfied even when the historical worsening test is not. 
Imagine that B is a model who is wrongfully detained by A and thereby 
prevented from taking part in the Miss America Pageant. If she had 
been able to enter the contest, B would have won a million dollars. 
Feinberg holds that B' s condition has not been historically worsened, 
"because she is no worse off than before the detention."11 But because 
she is worse off than she would have been if she had not been detained, 
the counterfactual test is satisfied, and she is harmed. Feinberg in fact 
argues that sometimes A can harm B even though A not only did not 
historically worsen B' s condition but actually bettered it. Feinberg asks 
us to imagine that doctor A treats B, her patient, and improves his 
condition, but because she was negligent she did not improve it as much 
as she should have done. Although A bettered B' s condition in an 
historical sense, Feinberg claims that A harmed B because the 
counterfactual condition has been violated: B is worse off than he would 
have been had A behaved as she ought to have done (as she had a duty to 
do). As Feinberg remarks in a footnote, this example only shows what 
he wants it to show if condition 6 is revised to hold that B' s condition is 
in a worse state than it would have been in if A had acted as she should 
have done, rather than if she had not acted as she did. I will return to 
this kind of case at the end of this Part. 
In light of the above considerations, let me reformulate Feinberg's 
analysis of A's harming B along the following lines: 
1 0. /d. at 9 14. 
1 1. FEINBERG, supra note 2, at 7 .  
1287 
(1 ) A acts (in a sense wide enough to include omissions and extended 
sequences of activity). 
(2) A's action is a cause of an adverse effect on one of B' s interests 
(a "state of harm"). 
(3)  B's personal interest is in a worse condition (usually but not 
always lower on the interest graph) than it would be had A not 
acted as he did ("the counterfactual condition"). 
Floating in the background somewhere, but apparently not a part of 
the analysis, we have: 
(3X) B's personal interest is in a worse condition (lower on the 
interest graph) than it was in before A acted ("the worsening 
condition"). 
I mention, in passing, that it is not entirely clear what the relationship 
is supposed to be between conditions 2 and 3. Does condition 2 require 
an actual historical worsening, where we must then look to condition 3 
to determine if that worsening was "harm"? This does not seem consistent 
with Feinberg's understanding of the Miss America example (or, for that 
matter, with the words "a state of harm" that he places in parentheses to 
describe condition 2). Probably the better view is that conditions 3 and 
3 X  are meant to be alternative interpretations of condition 2, where 
Feinberg himself favors condition 3 as the preferable interpretation. 
Henceforth, when I refer to Feinberg's analysis of harming, it will be 
to this reformulated version, involving conditions 1 through 3 .  
Feinberg considers a possible problem to which the counterfactual test 
might be thought to give rise. The standard hypothetical of the doomed 
airplane helps to make this problem clear. B gets in A's  taxicab to be 
driven to the airport. En route, A drives negligently and hits another car. 
B breaks his leg in the accident and as a result misses his flight. The 
plane that B missed crashes soon after takeoff, and all aboard are killed. 
It is as certain as anything can be that had B caught the flight, he too 
would have been killed. Feinberg asks if A harmed B by negligently 
causing his leg to be broken. He concedes that while common sense 
seems to say yes, his analysis appears to say no. Applying the 
counterfactual test, B' s overall interests would not only have been not 
better served on balance had A driven his cab carefully, they would in 
fact have been worsened (because B would have been dead). 
Feinberg considers the possibility that the way to deal with this and 
related difficulties might be to replace condition 3 in his analysis, which 
is the counterfactual test, with a disjunctive condition consisting of 
conditions 3 and 3X. Thus A harms B, as a result of an act by A, only if 
either B' s condition is historically worsened by the act orB is worse off 
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than he would have been had A not acted. But Feinberg does not think 
that this disjunctive solution will work either. Suppose, he suggests, that 
A's gang abducts B the day before the Miss America Pageant, thus 
preventing B from participating and thereby winning a million dollars. 
However, if A's gang had not abducted her, then C's gang, in a 
completely independent operation, would have done so. Feinberg argues 
that the historical worsening test is not met for the reason that he gave in 
the earlier variant of this example, namely, because B is no worse off 
historically after the abduction than she was before. But the counterfactual 
condition is also not met: B is not worse off than she would have been 
had A not abducted her, because if A had not done so, then C would 
have. Feinberg thinks it is nonetheless intuitively obvious that B was 
harmed in this example. 
Although he is not entirely clear about this, Feinberg's response to 
these difficulties is apparently to reject the disjunctive solution and to 
retain the counterfactual condition, namely condition 3, as the 
touchstone of when one person has caused another person harm. 
Feinberg believes that the doomed airplane case and the second Miss 
America case have a common structure. A first harmer, H1, puts V in a 
worse position for a period of time t. After t, a second harmer, H2 would 
have caused equal or greater harm. H1 is V' s actual harmer, "partly in 
virtue of his satisfying the counterfactual condition for time t."12 But, 
Feinberg asks, consider the case in which V' s injuries linger on after t; 
for example, the would-be airline passenger's leg is still broken even 
after the plane has crashed. Feinberg assumes that the law would 
nonetheless permit the passenger to recover compensation even for the 
injury after time t, and comments as follows: 
The law, I think, implicitly assumes a distinction between the harm actually 
caused to V by H1 on balance (which is determined in part by the counterfactual 
test) and the harm that H1 is justly answerable for. The harmful state that V 
remains in is a kind of "causal residue" directly resulting from the harm that H1 
did cause. It is unquestionably a harmful condition but strictly speaking after the 
passage of interval t, it is not a harmed condition, that is, not a net harm produced 
by H1's act of harming. Neve1theless, it is perfectly just to hold H1 liable for the 
full damages, including those beyond what he actually caused, because only an 
unforeseeable fluke of chance (e.g., a plane crash) accounts for the brevity of the 
period during which the counterfactual condition continued to be satisfied. In 
short, H1 hmmed V because there was some period, however brief, during which 
the counterfactual condition was satisfied, and he is justly answerable for the 
12. Id. at 1 0 . 
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effects of the harm he originally caused, since it was only a fluke of, chance, not 
anything he can claim credit for, that limited the scope of his harming.13 
Feinberg may or may not be right about the justice of H1 's 
compensating V . That is a question to which I shall return in Part V. 
But I believe the details of his account are nonetheless mistaken. As an 
aside, I note that it is very difficult to see how Feinberg would apply his 
own solution to the variant Miss America problem, because it is not 
clear that, by Feinberg's own lights, B was worse off, between the time 
of A's abduction and the time that C' s abduction would have taken 
place, than she would have been if A had not abducted her.14 For the 
moment, however, let us leave Miss America to one side and focus 
instead on the doomed airplane hypothetical. Feinberg might be taken to 
be suggesting, in the above passage, that H1 did not cause the harmful 
condition from which V was still suffering at time t and following. That 
would be a very strong claim, and a very implausible one on any 
acceptable theory of causation. But how else are we to construe 
Feinberg's argument? Perhaps the clue resides in the claim tha.t there 
was no net harm. This claim is presumably based on Feinberg's thesis, 
mentioned earlier, that all interests can be "summed up or integrated into 
one emergent personal interest." I shall argue in Part IV that there is no 
good reason to accept this thesis, but even if it were correct, the result 
would surely be that H1 has not harmed V at all, not just that he has not 
harmed him after time t. The plus to be weighed against the minus of 
B' s broken leg is, after all, the saving of his life. So long as we accept a 
counterfactual rather than an historical worsening interpretation of harm 
(condition 3 rather than 3X), there does not seem to be any good reason 
to limit the "netting out" effect, if there is one, to time t and after. While 
it is true that there is a period between the time when the leg was broken 
and the time of the crash during which it would be possible to say that, 
applying the counterfactual criterion to that period only, V was worse 
off, it is not clear why we should limit the application of the test during 
this period to that period. Given that the counterfactual test is not an 
historical test, why should it not be applied on an ali-in basis which takes 
account of everything that would have happened if H1 had not acted as 
he did? Even at a time after the accident but before the crash, is V not 
better off, counterfactually speaking, than he would have been if H had 
not negligently caused the accident? 
1 3. Id. at 10-1 1 .  
1 4. It is not entirely clear what Feinberg thinks the harm consists of in this 
example. The most plausible candidates are not being able to enter the pageant, being 
prevented from winning the pageant, and being prevented from collecting the million 
dollars. All of these events, we can assume, take place after the time that C' s abduction 
would have taken place. 
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Even if I am wrong to conclude that Feinberg's reliance on interest­
summing and netting-out is, in each case, problematic, there are other 
difficulties with his counterfactual account of harm. Consider a variant 
on the Kingston case discussed above. Suppose that A sets a fire which 
burns down B's house.15 There is another fire that would have burned 
down the house if A's fire had not already done so, but it is prevented 
from having that effect because A's fire consumed some of the fuel that 
lies between the second fire and the house. It turns out that, if A's fire 
had not existed, the second fire would have reached B' s house at the 
exact moment when, in fact, A's fire did. Thus, there is no period t 
during which it is possible to say that B was (counterfactually) worse off 
than if A had not set the fire. According to Feinberg's account, A did not 
harm B. But this seems plainly wrong. Perhaps A does not have to 
compensate B for the harm he caused, but that is another question. It 
seems indisputable that, in burning down B' s house, A caused B harm, 
and that this is true even if the same kind of harm, in the same degree, 
would have been caused at the exact same time by some other fire had 
A's fire not existed. 
I have concentrated so far on cases in which the counterfactual 
understanding of harm would lead us to say that there is no harm but 
where, intuitively, harm exists. But there are also many cases in which 
the counterfactual understanding would lead us to say that there is harm 
where, intuitively, there is none. This is because, as Shiffrin points out, 
a pure counterfactual account of harm does not, and cannot, draw any 
distinction between harming and failing to benefit.16 I am not harmed 
just because, were things different in some relevant way, I would have 
been better off than I am now. 
The solution to all these various difficulties is, I think, the following. 
Instead of analyzing harm by reference to the counterfactual condition 
(condition 3), we should analyze it by reference to the historical 
worsening condition (condition 3 X). Our concept of harm is such that 
harm only occurs if there is an actual worsening, that is, an historical 
setback to an interest: If B was harmed, then there must be some relevant 
interest of B' s that was initially at level n and that was caused by the 
15 .  I note in passing that, for the reasons discussed earlier, the question of whether 
A harmed B does not seem to depend on whether or not A acted wrongfully in setting the 
fire, although of course the question of whether A owes B compensation might well so 
depend. 
1 6 . Shiffrin, supra note 3, at 121 .  
1 29 1  
allegedly harmful event to be at a level below n. I should note immediately 
that I am putting this requirement forward as a necessary condition for 
the occurrence of harm. I am not suggesting that it is a sufficient condition. 
Why, it might be asked, should we not adopt a conjunctive solution, 
according to which A harmed B only if both conditions 3 and 3 X  are 
met? Perhaps we might say, using the variant of Kingston just discussed, 
that the historical worsening caused by A's fire was "protoharm," but 
because the counterfactual condition was not met, B did not suffer harm 
in the true or full sense. The answer to this suggestion has to be, I 
believe, that it simply does not conform to our ordinary concept of harm. 
Our ordinary concept is relatively minimalist. What I have called 
protoharm just is harm; no further adornment is required to turn it into 
the real thing. Of course, there are further interesting questions about 
responsibility and liability for harm caused, and the answers to these 
questions can be quite nuanced. For example, the law accepts that whether 
or not A owes B compensation in the variant Kingston hypothetical just 
discussed depends on whether or not the second fire was set tortiously. 
If it was set tortiously, then A owes compensation even though the 
counterfactual condition has apparently not been met. 17 I will suggest in 
Part V that the law is correct on this point, and if that is so, then 
Feinberg's counterfactual analysis of harm would presumably have to be 
revised or qualified in some way. The main point for present purposes, 
however, is that whether or not the law is right here, it is surely a 
mistake to fold these difficult questions of moral and legal responsibility 
into the concept of harm itself. The paradigm of harm is an historical 
worsening. Once we have established that A caused B harm in this sense 
then further questions of responsibility and liability arise, and these 
might well involve counterfactual analysis. But these questions are 
distinct from the determination of whether or not harm occurred in the 
f
. 1 18 
1rst p ace. 
What are we to say, then, of Feinberg' s  Miss America hypothetical? 
In both its versions (one abductor in the first variant, one abductor and 
another waiting in the wings, in the second), Feinberg maintains that B, 
the abductee, suffered no historical worsening; she is no worse off after 
the abduction than she was before. Feinberg thinks that she suffered 
harm in both variants because she is worse off counterfactually; if she 
had not been abducted, she would have won the contest and a million 
dollars. But Feinberg is wrong to suggest that there has been no 
1 7 . This is, at least, the law according to Kingston itself. Kingston v. Chi. & N.W. 
Ry., 2 1 1 N.W. 9 1 3 ,9 1 4-1 5  (Wis. 1 927). 
1 8 . There are some limited exceptions to this generalization, such that the moral 
quality of the act leading to harm affects the character and extent of the harm itself. I 
will discuss such cases later in this Part. 
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historical worsening here. A deprived B, the would-be Miss America, of 
an option or an opportunity to enter the pageant, and such a deprivation 
is a setback to her autonomy of a kind that constitutes harm.19 The 
failure to win the contest and the million dollars are instances of 
consequential damage flowing from this initial harm. I do not think it 
matters in this regard that A violated a right of B' s (by wrongfully 
detaining her)?0 Suppose instead that he had innocently and 
nonnegligently misdirected her, telling her that the pageant was in 
Atlantic City when for some obscure and generally unknown reason it 
was being held that year in Houston. I believe the proper conclusion is 
that A (innocently) caused B harm, because, again, A interfered with B's 
autonomy by depriving her of a valuable option or opportunity. He 
induced B to rely on the assumption that the pageant was in Atlantic City 
and, accordingly, to behave in a way that eliminated her option of 
getting to Houston, where the pageant was actually to take place. The 
loss of the relevant option flows from B' s detrimental reliance. It is 
possible that there are contextual limits on the manner in which A can 
affect B' s options and still be said to have harmed her. For example, 
suppose that A did not innocently direct B away from the pageant but 
instead cancelled the entire affair the year that B was hoping to enter. (A 
was the pageant's CEO, if there is such a person, and he acted 
justifiably, for reasons relating to the pageant's shaky finances.) A has 
still deprived B of the option of entering the pageant, but it is not entirely 
clear that B has been harmed here, at least in the way that she would 
19 .  Cj: JOSEPH RAZ, THE MORALITY OF FREEDOM 41 3 ( 1 986). In his comment on 
this Article, John Goldberg seems to assume that I am committed to treating "lost 
expectancies," meaning interferences with the expectation interest in contract law, as a 
subcategory of lost opportunities. See John C.P. Goldberg, Harm, Injwy, and Proximate 
Cause, 40 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1315, 1 328-29 (2003 ). But this is a misunderstanding. In 
the case of a lost opportunity, A has done something (detained B, induced B to rely to her 
detriment, etc.) such that B no longer has an option to do something which she had 
before A acted. Interferences with the expectation interest in contract law can involve 
the loss of an opportunity in this sense, but they need not. Rather, an interference with 
the expectation interest constitutes the violation of a cettain kind of right, and, as we 
shall see in Part IV. the violation of a right does not necessarily involve either an 
intetference with autonomy (the deprivation of an option) or, indeed, harm of any kind. 
Conversely. intetferences with autonomy do not necessarily amount to the violation of a 
right. Consider the case in the text in which A innocently misdirects B to Atlantic City, 
thereby depriving her of the option of getting to Houston and entering the pageant there. 
A has interfered with B's autonomy, but it would not be plausible to say that he has 
violated one of her rights. 
20. Such a detention is, of course, harm in itself, partly but not entirely because it 
constitutes an interference with autonomy. 
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have been harmed by being prevented from entering a contest that was in 
fact being held and that others were free to enter. This seems to be the 
case even if, as a counterfactual matter, B would have won the pageant 
had it in fact been held. But this is a speculative point, and nothing turns 
on it for subsequent purposes. 
As we saw at the outset, Feinberg is concerned to analyze the notion 
of "A harming B" rather than the notion of "harm" as such. I have 
already suggested that his original conditions 2, 3, and 5, which were 
concerned with the moral character of A's act (was it faulty, a rights 
violation, excused or justified, and so on), are irrelevant to the 
characterization of the outcome for B as harm. I now wish to suggest, 
along much the same lines, that the requirement of human agency in 
Feinberg's conditions 1 and 2 (on the slimmed-down version of 
Feinberg's analysis that I presented earlier) is similarly irrelevant. 
Condition 1 holds that A acted (or in a suitable sense omitted to act), 
while condition 2 holds that A's action is the cause of an adverse effect 
on one of B' s interests. On the minimalist, historical analysis of harm 
that I have suggested lies at the core of our ordinary concept, the gist of 
harm is the historical worsening of one of B' s interests. Such a 
worsening is the result of a causal process; it is an event that has been 
precipitated by other events. In general, there is no reason to think that 
the analysis of harm changes in any significant way if one of the 
precipitating events was an instance of human agency?
1 
There is no 
reason, in other words, to think that the relational notion of "A harms B" 
is morally richer or more complicated than the conjunction of the 
concept of harm and the concept of agency. Harm is a moral concept, in 
the sense that we require moral argument to establish what is and is not 
harm, but I think the relevant moral argument is for the most part limited 
to what happens and does not extend to how it happens. 
On the basis of the foregoing, I conclude that there is no distinct 
relational moral category of the kind Feinberg apparently sets out to 
describe. This means that there is no general moral category that takes 
the form "A harms B." But it does not follow that there cannot be 
special kinds of harm that can only be caused by human actions. For 
example, it is plausible to think that the p1imary manner in which 
2 1 . Andrew Simester made the point in his comments at the Oxford Jurisprudence 
Colloquium that it seems odd to say that a person has been harmed by nature, as opposed 
to having been harmed by another person. It is no doubt true that the subject of the verb 
"to harm'' is usually a phrase referring to a person, and perhaps it does seem somewhat 
stilted to say that a storm, say, harmed someone. But I think there are many other 
locutions that are perfectly natural and that make clear that it is not just human agency 
that can cause harm. I think it is quite appropriate, for example, to say that someone 
suffered harm during a hurricane. 
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dignitary interests are set back involves the deliberate actions of others. 
It is no doubt true that one's dignity can be adversely affected in many 
different ways, but there nonetheless seems to be a distinctive kind of 
harm that is suffered when one is subjected to deliberate indignity by 
another person. R.A. Duff has argued along similar lines that the 
primary harm associated with rape is internal to the act of rape: 
"[E]ssential to the description and identification of the harm as a harm is 
a human action which perpetrates it."22 The harm in such cases 
presumably consists partly in the interference with autonomy, bodily 
integrity, and emotional well-being, and partly in the fact that this state 
of affairs was brought about intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly by 
another human being. 23 The general point to be emphasized for present 
purposes, however, is that most harms are not like this. A broken leg is 
a broken leg, and this is true even if the leg was broken as a result of 
another person's agency. 
The upshot of the discussion so far, then, is that the core characteristic 
of harm, and a necessary condition of the occurrence of harm, is the 
historical worsening condition: 
HWC: A person has been harmed only if some relevant interest of 
that person has been affected adversely, meaning the interest has been 
caused to worsen or deteriorate in time. 
Let me add three quick points of clarification. First, the HWC claims 
that all harms are historical setbacks to interests. It does not follow, 
however, that all historical setbacks to interests are harms. That is why I 
22. R.A. Duff, Intentions Legal and Philosophical, 9 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 76, 
90 ( 1 989); see also R.A. DUFF, INTENTION, AGENCY AND CRIMINAL LIABILITY: 
PHILOSOPHY OF ACTION AND THE CRIMINAL LAW 1 1 1-1 5 ( 1 990) [hereinafter DUFF, 
CRIMINAL LIABILITY). 
23 . In John Goldberg's comment on this Article, he apparently takes me to be 
saying that any rights violation is a harm of this special kind. See Goldberg, supra note 
1 9, at 1 3 1 9 . But this is a misunderstanding. In my view, this special kind of harm-to 
use Goldberg's helpful terminology, "relational" or "dyadic'' harm, which is to be 
contrasted with the usual case of "monadic" harm, see id.-involves interference with a 
particular class of interests, of which dignity is the main (and perhaps only) instance. 
The harm in rape is relational rather than monadic because an interest of this sort was 
adversely affected (along with other interests, of course). Perhaps relational harms are 
usually rights violations, but the two categories do not coincide, and neither is a subset of 
the other. Note that while it is true that a right can only be violated by a person, it does 
not follow that the harm (if any) which is associated with a rights violation must be of a 
kind that can only be caused by human action. I further discuss the relationship between 
harm and rights in Pan IV. 
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have formulated the HWC in terms of relevant interests rather than just 
interests. I will return to this point later. The second point is one that I 
mentioned at the beginning of this Article. While I have rejected the 
claim that harm should be understood by reference, in whole or in part, 
to the counterfactual condition, this does not mean that a counterfactual 
inquiry has no place in determining whether or not harm has occurred. 
Harm is the result of a causal process, and the correct analysis of 
causation might well require us to engage in counterfactual inquiry in 
order to determine what is a cause of what.24 But even if it is true that 
we have to employ counterfactuals to characterize properly the causation 
of a harmful event, the determination that the event was a hannful one 
does not depend on counterfactual inquiry. It depends, rather, on an 
historical comparison of before and after. The third point is that even if 
a counterfactual analysis does not figure in the determination of whether 
an event was harmful, it might well figure, as has already been noted, in 
the quantification of damages in tort law. I discuss this issue in Part V. 
As I have characterized the historical worsening account, it does not 
require a particular account of causation, but it does require that harm 
have been brought about by a causal process. I have further argued that 
the harmful character of the end result is determined historically rather 
than counterfactually. Now it is true that one could offer a mixed 
account of harm, by which I mean an account that requires harm to be 
the outcome of a causal process but that determines the harmful character 
of the end result by means of a counterfactual inquiry. As a general matter, 
however, this grouping of caused event and counterfactual characterization 
of harm seems quite artificial. It seems designed simply to get around 
the fact that a pure counterfactual analysis of harm-that is, one that 
compares the current state of affairs to what would or should have 
happened, without inquiring into how the current state of affairs came 
about-will be completely incapable, without more, of distinguishing a 
harm from a failure to benefit. The more natural correlation would seem 
to be between the requirement that there be a causal process and the 
characterization of the end result of that process as harmful because it 
was an historical worsening. This is more natural because an historical 
24. As was noted earlier, Michael Moore makes a very strong case for the view 
that causation is not properly understood simply by reference to a counterfactual test. 
See supra note l. In my view, the best analysis of causation is given by what Richard 
Wright has called the NESS test: A cause is a Necessary, i.e. nonredundant Element of a 
Sufficient Set, meaning a set of conditions minimally sufficient to bring about the effect 
in question. See Richard W. Wright, Causation in Tort Law, 73 CAL. L. REV. 1 735 ,  1774 
( 1985). This understanding of causation is based on the idea of instantiating a causal 
law. It does not reduce causation to a counterfactual test, but counterfactual inquiry will 
nonetheless be involved in determining whether a particular chain of events is or is not 
an instantiation of some causal law. 
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worsening just is a certain kind of causal process. The requirement of a 
causal process has not, as with the mixed account, been tacked on to an 
otherwise self-sufficient and freestanding account of harm, namely, the 
pure counterfactual approach, simply to avoid certain counterintuitive 
consequences. 
In arguing for the historical worsening condition, I have pointed out 
what I take to be serious difficulties for an understanding of harm based 
on the counterfactual condition. This is not to say, of course, that an 
understanding based on the historical condition is without problems of 
its own. In the remainder of this Part, I would like to discuss some 
difficult cases that have been drawn to my attention by commentators. 
First, consider the case of a preconception tort, in which someone does 
something to the body of a woman who is likely to become a mother that 
has the effect, when she subsequently becomes pregnant, of preventing 
the fetus from developing two arms.25 Intuitively this appears to be a 
case of harm, even though there is no obvious historical worsening. 
(The fetus never lost an arm; it only had one from the outset.) Consider 
also a case in which someone acts in such a way as to prevent someone 
25. This hypothetical is based on, but different from, one posed by John Goldberg 
in his comment. See Goldberg, supra note 1 9 , at 1 329-30. In the Goldberg variation, a 
couple unreasonably fails to take a pill that, if taken within a few hours before or after 
sexual intercourse, would have prevented a birth defect in their child. I have not used 
Goldberg's hypothetical because it contains a complication, namely, the question of 
whether the birth defect is the result  of an act or an omission, that somewhat obscures 
our intuitions. If the defect is properly described as the result of an omission, then I do 
not think it is appropriately described as harm. This is because pure omissions cannot, in 
my view, be causes, whereas harms are always the result of a causal process. On the 
question of omissions as causes, see Moore, supra note 1 ,  at 1 222-26 ; Michael S. 
Moore, Causation and Responsibility, Soc. PHIL. & PoL'Y, Summer 1999, at 1 ,  23-24, 
3 1 -34. As Moore argues, the relata in causal statements are events, not facts, and while 
an omission is a fact, it is not an event. It is worth noting that if one adopted the contrary 
view. namely that omissions can be causes (at least in  cases where the omitted act could 
have prevented harm or conferred a benefit), and combined it with a full-fledged 
counterfactual analysis of harm, the distinction between harming and fai ling to benefit 
would disappear completely, even on what I called in the text a mixed account of harm. 
This might not be an argument in itself against the conclusion that omissions can be 
causes, but it is an unsettling result. None of this is meant to deny, of course, that we can 
have affirmative duties to bling about certain states of affairs and that we can properly be 
labeled responsible for failing to bring about those states of affairs. Sometimes such 
failures will involve harm, as, for example, when the right holder relies to her detriment 
on the expectation that the other party will act in accordance with his duty. Often, 
however, the breach of an affirmative duty will simply amount to a failure to confer a 
benefit. See further supra note 1 9  and the discussion at the end of Part IV. 
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else from recovering from an injury or a disease.26 Intuitively this too 
appears to be a case of harm, but again there seems to be no historical 
worsening. 
The counterfactual approach could explain why there is harm in these 
cases, but I believe the general difficulties with that approach make it 
too unattractive a solution to adopt on even an ad hoc basis. I am far 
from certain what the correct analysis of such cases is, but I would like 
to suggest very tentatively that they may, despite initial appearances, in 
fact be instances of historical worsenings. The first point to be noted is 
that both cases involve a causal process. The second is that that process 
affects what might be called a natural potential. In the one case we have 
the natural potential and tendency of a fetus to develop, in the absence of 
external interference, two arms, and in the other we have the natural 
potential and tendency of the body to heal itself, again in the absence of 
external interference. If this potential is absent in either case, it seems 
clear that there is no harm. In both cases, the being who has been affected 
can be said to have an interest in the realization of the relevant potential. 
(I am assuming for present purposes that a fetus has interests.) I 
acknowledge that the idea that harm can take the form of interference 
with a potential is slippery ground, because it might easily slide into a 
mixed counterfactual account of the kind discussed earlier. It would be 
easy to make this slide because in any case where a person would 
have been better off in the absence of a specified causal process, it is 
presumably possible to say that there has been interference with some 
kind of "potential." It would be implausible to claim that all such 
interferences are harm. However, once we introduce the idea of a 
potential it might be difficult to avoid biting that particular bullet, and 
once the bullet has been bitten it would be implausible to claim that the 
harmful character of every such interference depends on an historical 
rather than a counterfactual inquiry. In order to characterize interference 
with a natural potential as an historical worsening, I think that much 
must therefore rest on the idea that the potential is a natural one, 
meaning one that inheres in the nature of the being affected.27 I am not 
sure at the moment how to develop this idea further; as I said earlier, this 
general approach to the problem cases is offered only tentatively. 
26. Cases of this kind were pointed out to me independently by Richard Arneson 
and Tony Honore. 
27. As was noted in Part II, Feinberg believes that a doctor who improves the 
condition of a patient, but not as much as she should have done, has harmed the patient. 
In my opinion, this is not a case of harm but rather a failure to confer a benefit. It does 
not matter, for purposes of this analysis, that the doctor was under a duty to confer the 
benefit. I am assuming that the doctor did not impede a natural potential to recover, but 
simply failed to make things better in a situation where they would not have gotten better 
on their own. See further supra note 25. 
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III. SHIFFRIN ' S CRITIQUE OF THE COMPARATIVE MODEL 
Both Feinberg's counterfactual analysis of harm and the historical 
worsening account depend on a comparison between two states of 
affairs. The former compares what has happened with what would have 
happened, while the latter compares what has happened with the status 
quo ante. Seana Shiffrin takes both types of account to be particular 
versions of what she calls the "comparative" model of harm, and she 
offers a critique of that model which she maintains applies to both 
versions. She takes Feinberg's analysis of harm as her primary target, 
but insofar as the problems she discerns with the comparative model 
flow from comparison tout court, rather than from counterfactual 
comparison in particular, the critique is prima facie applicable to the 
historical worsening account as well. Shiffrin describes the comparative 
model in the following terms: 
[M]any regard h arms and benefits as though they represent two ends of a scale, 
like the scale of positive and negative numbers. Benefits are thought to be just 
l ike h arms, except that harms are bad and benefits are good. On Feinberg's 
natural and attractive interpretation of this symmetrical picture, harms involve 
the setback of one's interests, whereas benefits involve the advancement of 
one's interests along a sliding scale of promotion and decline. To evaluate 
whether an event has benefited or harmed a person, one compares, with respect 
to the fulfillment of his interests, either his beginning and his end points 
(historical models), or his end point and where he would have been otherwise 
(counterfactual models). If he has ascended the scale (either relative to his 
beginning point or alternative position), then he has been benefitted (sic]. If he 
moves down, then he has been harmed. Either way, one arrives at an all-things­
considered judgment that either harm or benefit (but not both) has been bestowed. 
Thus, because he has been overall benefited, he has not been harmed. 28 
Shiffrin argues that there are many problems with the comparative 
model, thus understood. First, it fails to explain certain "deep asymmetries" 
between benefit and harm. Shiffrin claims that we often look upon failing 
to be benefited as morally and substantively less serious than both being 
harmed and being saved from harm. She notes that this asymmetry is 
impossible to make sense of on a counterfactual model, but that even on 
an historical model the distance between the start and end points may be 
too small to explain the asymmetry properly. Second, either the historical 
or the counterfactual version of a comparative account will have to say 
that persons who have been moved to status x from different ends of the 
scale have been benefited or harmed respectively, regardless of their 
28. Shiffrin, supra note 3, at 12 1 (footnote omitted). 
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starting points. Suppose A is (or would otherwise have been) at x - 2, 
and is moved to x. B, on the other hand, is (or would otherwise have 
been) at x + 2, and is also moved to x. The comparative model is 
committed to saying that A has been benefited and B harmed, even 
though they are now identically situated. Because of what she takes to 
be the asymmetry of benefits and harms, Shiffrin regards this as a 
problematic outcome. It would be even more problematic, she believes, 
if A is moved from x - 4 to x - 3, whereas B is moved from x + 2 to x + 
1 .  In this hypothetical, the comparative model tells us that A is benefited 
and B harmed, even though B is better off, all things considered, than A. 
"If this were so, why should harm, per se, in this sense, be a special 
subject of moral concern and have greater priority than failures to be 
benefited ?"29 
Shiffrin offers a number of other criticisms of the comparative model 
of harm, but all of them are related to her central thesis that that model 
cannot explain the asymmetry that she says exists between harms and 
benefits. She therefore offers a rival account of harm, the most 
significant aspect of which is its noncomparative character: 
Typically, harm involves the imposition of a state or condition that directly or 
indirectly obstructs, prevents, frustrates, or undoes an agent' s  cognizant 
interaction with her circumstances and her efforts to fashion a life within them 
that is distinctively and authentically hers . . . .  To be harmed primarily involves the 
imposition of conditions from which the person undergoing them is reasonably 
alienated or which are strongly at odds with the conditions she would rationally 
will . . . . On this view, pain counts as a harm because it exerts an insi stent, 
intrusive, and unpleasant presence on one's  consciousness that one must j ust 
undergo and endure. Disabilities, injured limbs, and illnesses also qualify as 
harms. They forcibly impose experiential conditions that are affirmatively contrary 
to one ' s  wi l l ;  al so, they impede s ignificantly one' s capacities for act ive 
agency . . . . Death, too, unless rationally willed, seriously interferes with the 
exercise of agency.30 
I should note, to begin, that I have some doubts about Shiffrin 's  
introduction into her account of the idea that harm consists of conditions 
that are, inter alia, ones from which one is alienated or which one did not 
or would not rationally will. This strikes me as problematic for the 
reason that it makes harm potentially too subjective a notion. If, for 
whatever reason, one is not alienated from a condition that would 
otherwise count as harm, or if one rationally willed the condition (say, 
via consent), should we therefore conclude that the person is not 
suffering harm? My inclination is to say no; while one can consent to 
29. /d. at 1 22. Shiffrin notes that a loss as such can be a morallv significant harm 
if there were an expectation or personal investment involved, but arg�es,
�
correctly, that 
the comparative model does not make anything turn on the fact of expectation or 
investment. !d. 
30. !d. at 1 23-24. 
1 300 
[VOL. 40: 1 283, 2003] Harm, History, and Counterfactuals 
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW 
harm, such consent does not (except in special cases)3
1 
transform the 
harmful condition into a nonharmful one. I will say no more about this 
issue here, however. My primary concern is not with Shiffrin's 
alternative account of harm as such, but rather with its relevance to her 
critique of the comparative model. 
In the displayed passage quoted above, Shiffrin seems to use the term 
"imposed" in two different ways. Early in the passage she writes that 
" [t]o be harmed primarily involves the imposition of conditions from 
which the person undergoing them is reasonably alienated." This suggests, 
to my mind, that what is being imposed are such conditions as a 
disability, an injured limb, or an illness. Because these conditions would 
presumably be "imposed" by means of a causal mechanism, this 
understanding of "imposition" is completely consistent with the historical 
worsening condition. Later in the passage, however, Shiffrin speaks of 
disabilities, injured limbs, and illnesses as themselves imposing 
experiential conditions that are affirmatively contrary to one's will. This 
suggests that, on Shiffrin's view, disabilities, injured limbs, and other 
harms are simply conditions, meaning states of being that involve or lead 
to (impose) further, experiential conditions such as unpleasant mental 
states or a subnormal capacity for agency. To count as harm, these 
states of being need not have come about as the result of any historical 
worsening. On this view, a disability or an illness with which one was 
born is just as much a harm as a disability or an illness that befell one 
during one's lifetime. 
I am not sure which of these two senses of "imposition" Shiffrin 
would accept as giving the appropriate content to her affirmative account 
of harm. I believe, however, that the correct approach would be to 
incorporate the historical worsening condition into the account, thereby 
treating harms as states or events that are "imposed" in the sense that 
they are historical worsenings that were caused by prior states or events. 
Shiffrin seems to assume that the historical version of the comparative 
model must treat any worsening of an interest as a harm (and any 
improvement as a benefit). This does seem to be Feinberg's position (at 
least in the sense that the process of "netting out" takes account of all 
setbacks to interests on the minus side, and of all advancements on the 
3 1 .  The kind of special case I have in mind would be the harm that Duff argues is 
associated with rape; unlike most harms, this harm is integrally bound up with the human 
action that created it. See DUFF, CRIMINAL LIABILITY, supra note 22, at 1 1 1 - 1 2 . B ut if 
the sexual act is in fact consented to, then the harm in question does not exist at all .  
1 30 1  
plus side). But comparative models are not, in general, committed to 
that idea. The historical worsening account need only say that a 
worsening is a necessary condition of harm, not a sufficient condition. It 
is perfectly consistent with such an account that harms, to be harms, 
must also meet other conditions, such as, for example, those set out in 
Shiffrin's own affirmative analysis (that the worsened state be such that 
one is alienated from it or be unable rationally to will it). 
Shiffrin argues that "we often consider failing to be benefited as 
morally and significantly less serious than both being harmed and not 
being saved from harm."32 She notes, correctly, that counterfactual 
comparison models of harm cannot distinguish at all between harming 
and failing to benefit. She further notes, again correctly, that historical 
comparison models do have the resources to draw this distinction, but 
goes on to argue that "the distance between the end points that make it a 
harm rather than a failure to be benefited may be rather too small to 
account for the strength of our asymmetrical reactions."33 The point 
here would seem to be that the setbacks to interests that we regard as 
harms are often more serious than failures to confer a benefit because 
harms, unlike the general category of failing to benefit, necessarily 
involve particularly serious evils, such as illness or personal injury. I do 
not think that this conceptual claim is correct, but even if it is, we could, 
as was noted in the preceding paragraph, respond to the concern by 
supplementing the historical worsening condition rather than by 
rejecting it; we could insist that there are other necessary conditions that 
must be met before harm can be said to occur. Again, one possibility is 
Shiffrin's own affirmative analysis, although for the reasons stated 
earlier I have some doubts about the viability of that approach. It should 
also be noted that while we have or should have the same level of moral 
concern about serious evils like illness even when they do not come 
about as a result of an historical worsening (for example, when they 
involve congenital conditions), it does not follow that such evils simply 
are harms in the absence of an historical worsening. 
As I have already noted, the historical worsening model of harm is not 
committed to the view that all historical worsenings are harms. Even 
while conceding that point, though, I think Shiffrin' s case against the 
comparison model in general (and hence the historical worsening model 
in particular) is overstated. Consider her argument about two persons, A 
and B, who are both moved to interest level x, where the former was 
previously at level x - 2, while the latter was at level x + 2. The 
comparative model is committed, Shiffrin says, to saying that A has been 
32. Shiffrin, supra note 3,  at 1 2 1 .  
33. !d. a t  1 22. 
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benefited and B harmed, even though the two are now identically 
situated. But what is so obviously problematic about saying that? 
Suppose that A was suffering from a severe form of schizophrenia, while 
B was suffering from a mild form. Someone has done something to A to 
alleviate her condition somewhat, while someone else has done 
something to B to worsen his, so that they are now suffering from the 
disease to more or less the same degree. Is it not correct to say that B 
was harmed while A was benefited? Shiffrin asks, " [W]hy should harm, 
per se, in this sense [that is, in the comparative sense] , be a special 
subject of moral concern and have greater priority than failures to be 
benefited?"34 It is not entirely clear to me, however, that harm does have 
greater priority just because it is harm. What has priority, in the sense I 
think Shiffrin has in mind, is the existence of certain evils, which may or 
may not be associated with harm. It is also worth noting that there is, of 
course, another source of moral concern in the worsening of B' s 
condition, and that is the fact that it flowed from an act rather than an 
omission (or, perhaps, from a "doing" rather than an "allowing"). I 
believe that distinctions of this kind are doing far more work in our 
intuitions than Shiffrin acknowledges. 
Whether or not we accept Shiffrin' s particular account of harm as 
involving a condition from which one is alienated or which one could 
not rationally will, we still must ask whether or not a philosophical 
account of harm should limit the historical worsenings that count as 
harm to those that involve such discrete and serious evils as disease, 
disability, personal injury, or death. It seems to me that a satisfactory 
account should not be so limited. The ordinary concept of harm is 
properly applied, for example, to the model who was prevented from 
entering the Miss America pageant even though she was not subjected to 
an evil of the kind just mentioned. There may well be a de minimis 
constraint on the extent or seriousness of the setback to an interest that 
must obtain before the setback will count as harm, but that is a different 
matter. Even beyond that question, however, there remains more to be 
said about which interferences with which interests should count as 
harm, and it is to that general topic that I now turn. 
34. !d. 
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IV. HARM, INTERESTS, AND RIGHTS 
While I have rejected Feinberg's counterfactual analysis of harm, I 
have accepted his more fundamental point that a harm is a setback to an 
interest. I have further argued for the thesis that such a setback should 
be understood as an historical worsening. This invites the question: 
Which are the interests that, when set back, give rise to harm? Is any 
interference with any interest properly designated a harm? 
Let me begin by considering a hypothetical discussed by Feinberg. 
Suppose a rescuer rescues a seriously endangered person, but finds that 
in order to effect the rescue and save the imperiled person' s life, he 
necessarily has to break the other 's  arm in the process. One question 
that arises is this: Is the rescuer liable for the broken arm if the rescuee 
chooses to sue? But the piior, more fundamental question is the 
following: Did the rescuer harm the rescuee? In answer, Feinberg offers 
this argument: 
[T]he broken-armed plaintiff suffered a harmful condition with respect to his 
arm, but the rescuer-defendant did not cause a condition that was harmful on 
balance, offset as it was by the overriding benefit of rescue, and he cannot_be 
said, therefore , to have ha rmed the plaintiff (in the relevant full sense) at a]l.3:-> 
Shiffrin discusses this case and suggests, in light of her own affirmative 
discussion of harm, that we should not deny that the necessarily broken 
limb is a form of harm: "It imposes a condition of disability and inflicts 
pain. It seems to meet the criteria of harm, then, and does so irrespective 
of the concomitant benefits delivered alongside it; on these criteria, it 
can be harm even if, in some overall sense, the event makes the person 
better off. "36 
Even if we do not accept Shiffrin's  particular analysis of harm, she 
nonetheless seems exactly right in her analysis of the limb-snapping 
rescuer. Feinberg's claim to the contrary notwithstanding, there does not 
seem to be some overall interest into which all harms and benefits can be 
factored, making possible a net judgment about the harm (or benefit) that 
any given person has recei ved overall.37 The general interests that might 
3 5 .  FEINBERG, supra note 2 , at  2 7 .  
36. Shiffrin , supra note 3. at 1 25.  
37. In his contribution to this .�ymposium, Leo Katz offers a very interesting 
discussion of this kind of case. as well as of the general issue of netting out benefits 
against harms. See Leo Katz, What to Compi!IIS{it/! Some Swprising/y Unapprecia ted 
Reasons Why the Problem Is So Hard. 40 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 1 345 (2003 ).  I cannot 
discuss Katz's approach here, except to make the very general observation that I do not 
think he distinguishes sufficiently clearly between the question of netting out, which 
concerns the dual issues of the occuiTence of harm and the quantification of damages. 
from the question of whether or not a harmful act was justified by the benefits it also 
produced. 
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plausibly be thought to be candidates for this role are, presumably, 
welfare and autonomy. While autonomy strikes me as the more likely 
possibility of the two, in the end I do not think our ordinary concept of 
harm permits this kind of reductionism with respect to either of these 
general interests. This is, in part, a point about the concepts of harm and 
benefit themselves. While questions about the individuation of harms 
can and do arise, I believe that our general tendency is to treat setbacks 
to interests even in the same general category, for example, physical 
injuries to different parts of the body, as distinct harms. This is true 
even though personal injuries all tend to set back the same set of 
interests, namely, autonomy and freedom of movement, health, life, the 
physical integrity of the body, the interest in not experiencing pain, and 
the interest in not experiencing mental or emotional distress. Obviously, 
particular physical injuries set back various of these interests in different 
degrees, and some injuries will leave some of these interests unaffected. 
Perhaps that is part of the reason that we tend not to lump even 
concurrent instances of physical injury, let alone setbacks to interests 
that are less obviously systematically related, into a single aggregate 
harm. A fortiori, we do not net out harms against benefits. The most 
important reason not to lump or net out, however, is surely substantive 
in character. We have no good reason to think that the myriad array of 
interests that are subject to harm and benefit-those just mentioned in 
connection with physical injury, for a start, and many others as well, 
such as dignity, privacy, the interest that I have in living according to 
proper values, and interests of various kinds that I have in tangible and 
intangible property-can all be reduced to a single underlying interest of 
any kind. (This is not to deny, of course, that there is much overlap 
among the relevant interests.) As Shiffrin notes, the better way to view 
the limb-snapping case is that in the particular circumstances, the 
bestowal of the benefit (saving the rescuee's life) might justify the 
breaking of his arm for purposes of criminal or civil liability. 38 
I suggested in the preceding Patt that all harms are historical setbacks 
to interests, but further noted that there was no reason to think that all 
historical setbacks to interests are harms. I would like at this point to 
38 .  Shiffi·in. supra note 3. at 1 26. Having d iscussed the netting-out interpretation 
of  Feinberg's  expl anation of the l i mb-spl itti ng example.  Shiffi·i n goes on to  i nterpret 
h i m, more charitably. as putting forward the idea of ju sti fication of harm i nstead. Thi s  is 
a very plausible way to understand the particu lar examp l e ,  but it seems clear that what 
Feinberg himself  had in m i nd was netting out not just ification. 
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engage in a speculative and somewhat tentative inquiry that takes this 
thought as its starting point. It seems reasonable to think that there is 
some set of core or primary interests, all of which are roughly concerned 
with our well-being and how our lives go, that are, so to speak, the main 
targets of harm. These core interests may overlap to some extent, and 
some may be partially derivable from others. For present purposes, 
there is no need to try to ascertain exactly what the core interests are, but 
it seems plausible to think that many of the interests mentioned in the 
preceding paragraph will figure on any acceptable list. Assuming there 
is such a list of core interests, can we conclude that those are all the 
interests that we have? I think the answer is clearly no. Consider, for 
example, my interest in not being physically injured. As emerged in 
earlier discussion, this interest probably represents an amalgam of 
several different interests, but nothing will be lost for present purposes 
by treating it as discrete and stand-alone in character. If I have an 
interest in you not physically injuring me, surely I also have an interest 
in you not trying to physically injure me, as well as an interest in you not 
engaging in actions that would risk you physically injuring me. Does 
this mean that if you try to injure me but fail, or if you subject me to a 
risk of a physical injury that does not materialize, then I have been 
harmed? It is of course possible that the trying or risking will interfere 
with one or another of my core interests, say by causing me severe fright 
or subjecting me to indignity. In order, therefore, to focus on the precise 
question at issue, let me assume that no such core interest is set back by 
the trying or risking. The question remains: Was I harmed simply 
because you acted contrary to the interest that I have in you not 
attempting to physically injure me (or the interest that I have in you not 
subjecting me to certain kinds of risk)? 
I have argued elsewhere39 that because of the peculiar epistemic 
character of risk, subjecting another person to risk cannot, in and of 
itself, constitute a harm. I would now want to qualify that conclusion by 
saying that risking cannot be regarded as adversely affecting any interest 
that has a strong or plausible claim to be in the set of core or primary 
interests. The further suggestion I am advancing is that the very existence 
of a set of core interests will give rise to secondary interests which will 
at least sometimes be second-order interests, meaning interests that are 
defined recursively. The interest I have that you not subject me to 
certain kinds of risk of physical injury is just such a second-order 
interest. Do you harm me by acting contrary to that interest? My strong 
intuition is that you do not. The idea of a core of protected interests is, I 
39. Stephen R. Perry, Risk, Hann, and Responsibility, in PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS 
OF TORT LAW 32 1 (David G. Owen ed., 1 995). 
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believe, part of our concept of harm, although we may disagree about 
which interests lie inside the core and which outside. (Consider moral or 
aesthetic offence, for example.) Although I think Shiffrin was mistaken 
to ignore the historical worsening aspect of harm and thereby to equate 
harm with certain evil conditions alone, the fact that she focused on 
certain evil conditions I take to be itself a recognition of this truth. Once 
we have acknowledged, as I think the concept of harm itself forces us to 
do, that some adverse effects on interests are harms and some are not, 
the distinction between core interests on the one hand, and secondary 
interests on the other, becomes a very natural way to further systematize 
and make sense of this feature of the concept. 
It is worth noting two further points about the suggested distinction 
between first- and second-order interests. The first point is that, 
theoretically, there could be higher -order interests still, and the more 
rarefied these become, the less likely we are to say that interference with 
them constitutes harm. This offers at least some support to the idea 
that one cutoff between interests that can be harmed and those that 
cannot-obviously, I do not need to claim that this is the only such 
cutoff-should be drawn along the lines of core interests on the one 
hand, and higher-order interests on the other. The second point is that, 
even if it is true that interference with higher-order interests does not 
generally constitute harm, it does not follow that higher-order interests 
(or secondary interests generally) cannot be subject to a right. I assume, 
for purposes of the present discussion, an interest theory of rights along 
the lines proposed by Joseph Raz.40 There is nothing odd about the idea, 
and indeed it seems intuitively correct, that I have a right that you not try 
to physically injure me, even though a violation of that right which did 
not cause me physical injury would not itself be harm. The right is 
based on my interest that you not try to physically injure me, which is 
itself a second-order interest recursively derived from my first-order, 
core interest in not being physically injured. I can have a right that you 
not behave in a certain way that is not, in and of itself, harmful to me, 
because your behaving in that way might cause me to be harmed. 
Obviously a great deal more remains to be said about the relationship 
among harm, interests, and rights, and I cannot begin to do justice to the 
topic here. But I would like to add a few remarks that at least suggest 
40. RAZ, supra note 19 ,  at 1 65-92. I have benefited a great deal from Raz ' s  
discussion o f  the relationship between rights and interests. 
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the direction that further discussion should take.41 Why, it might be 
asked, should a secondary interest ever be subject to a right, if interference 
with that interest is not itself harm? The answer is that protecting 
secondary interests often has instrumental importance. This is true, for 
example, of the second-order interests that I have that others not try to 
physically injure me or subject me to the risk of physical injury. 
Protecting these interests will generally, although by no means invariably, 
help to ensure that my core interest in not being physically injured does 
not suffer a setback. On an interest theory of rights, A has a right against 
B only if, inter alia, some interest of A's is a sufficient reason to hold B 
to be under a duty.42 Clearly, the ultimate justification of a right that 
others not try to injure me or subject me to a risk of injury is my core 
interest in not being physically injured. But recognizing that the 
justification of a right sometimes runs through a secondary, instrumental 
interest shows that it is conceptually possible that a right can be violated, 
and an interest set back, without any harm occurring.43 Once this point 
is recognized, it becomes clear that one cannot, for example, simply help 
oneself to the conclusion that risk is harm by mere virtue of the fact that 
risking sets back an interest. All too often, I believe, the justification for 
this conclusion takes essentially this form,44 when what is required is a 
substantive moral argument to the effect that a secondary, instrumental 
interest is, for some purposes at least, morally on a par with a 
fundamental interest. In the absence of such an argument, there is simply 
no reason to think that risking is harming. 
Something similar holds for affirmative rights. Consider the important 
4 1 .  These remarks were prompted by the comments of John Goldberg and others 
on the version of this Article that I presented at the symposium on compensation and the 
Oxford Jurisprudence Colloquium. 
42. RAZ, supra note 1 9, at 1 66.  I should note that the distinction between core and 
secondary interests is related to, but not the same as, the distinction that Raz draws 
between core and derivative rights. See id. at 168-70. 
43. Often, of course, and perhaps usually, a right is justified directly by the core 
interest. When this is the case, a violation of the right is itself h arm. If A violates a right 
that B has not to be injured, then A has harmed B. But there are important examples, in 
addition to trying and risking, when this is not the case. Consider, for example, the 
interesting case of trespass, which is raised by John Goldberg in his comment. See 
Goldberg, supra note 1 9, at 1 32 1 -22. The right that others not trespass on one's  land 
protects an interest in the exclusive possession of the land. It seems to me that this 
interest is secondary and instrumental ; we only protect it in order to protect other 
interests, such as autonomy and privacy interests. Goldberg is thus correct to conclude 
that there can be harmless trespasses. On the general issue of harmless wrongs, see also 
Heidi M. Hurd, What in the World Is Wrong ?, 5 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 1 57 ,  2 1 2- 1 5 
( 1 994). 
44. See, e.g. , Wright, supra note 24, at 1 8 1 4- 1 6 . An exception to this 
generalization is Matthew Adler' s very interesting argument in Matthew D. Adler, Risk, 
Death and Harm: The Normative Foundations of Risk Regulation, 87 MINN. L. REV. 
1 293 (2003).  Unfortunately, I cannot discuss Adler's approach to these issues here. 
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cases of promising and contracting. Suppose that A promises B that, on 
a certain date and at a certain time, A will turn a pirouette. So far as the 
content of the promise is concerned, we can assume that nothing turns 
on whether or not B knows that A has turned the pirouette. But even if B 
never finds out whether or not A has done the promised act, A nonetheless 
has an obligation to turn a pirouette, and B has a corresponding right that 
A perform this action. It is possible, of course, that A's failure to turn a 
pirouette will harm B. B might rely in some way on A's turning the 
pirouette, or B might suffer disappointment when he discovers that A did 
not do as she promised. But let us assume that B did not so rely, and he 
never finds out whether or not A performed as promised. B nonetheless 
has an interest that A perform a pirouette at the specified time and place. 
As Raz has argued, every person has an interest that promises made to 
him will be kept, and B' s interest in A's performing a pirouette is just a 
special instance of this more general interest.45 In contract law, both the 
general and the special interest are known, in a harmless ambiguity, as 
the expectation interest. This is the interest that is protected by B' s right 
to performance.46 For obvious practical reasons, promises do not usually 
get made unless performance of the promise is likely to benefit the 
promisee.47 By "benefit," I mean the advancement of one or more of the 
promisee's core interests. But the expectation interest itself is best 
viewed as a secondary, instrumental interest. Thus, advancement of the 
expectation interest does not necessarily confer a benefit in the sense of 
advancing a core interest, and it is plausible to think that this is true in 
the pirouette case. Still less does a setback to the expectation interest, 
through a failure to fulfill one 's  duty to perform as promised, in itself 
constitute harm. Thus, it would be very implausible to think that if A 
violates B's right that A tum a pirouette, A has ipso facto harmed B. 
V. HARM AND COMPENSATION 
I come, finally, to the relationship between harm and compensation, 
particularly in the context of the law of torts. I have argued in preceding 
Parts that a necessary condition of harm, and indeed one of its principal 
features, is that there must have been an historical setback to one of the 
45. Cf RAZ, supra note 1 9, at 1 75. The alternative view, which Raz rejects (I 
believe correctly), is that the right is based on the promisee ' s  interest in the promised act. 
46. See generally Peter B enson, Contract, in A COMPANION TO PHILOSOPHY OF 
LAW AND LEGAL THEORY 24 (Dennis Patterson ed. ,  1 996 ). 
47. Cf RAZ, supra note 1 9, at 1 75. 
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relevant interests of the person who allegedly suffered harm. Assume 
for the present that this understanding of harm is correct. If A 
wrongfully harms B, and if harm is properly understood as an historical 
worsening, why should corrective justice not require full compensation 
for that very harm? Consider a variation on the Kingston case that 
involves preemptive causation. A wrongfully sets a fire which burns 
down B's house. If A 's  fire had not had this effect, then a naturally 
caused fire (say, one set by lightning) would have burned the house down 
a few moments later. The courts have generally said in this situation that 
B is not entitled to compensation, or if she is, it is only for the few 
moments of house-possession of which A deprived her.48 The general 
position was set down in 1 880  by Lord Blackburn in the Rawyards case: 
I do not think there is any difference of opinion as to its being a general rule 
that, where any injury is to be compensated by damages, in settling the sum of 
money to be given for reparation of damages you should as nearly as possible 
get at that sum of money which wil l  put the party who has been injured, or who 
has suffered, in the same position as he would h ave been in if he h ad not 
sustained the wrong for which he is now getting his compensation or 
reparation.49 
Determining compensation, in other words, requires a counterfactual 
inquiry. The idea is to put the plaintiff in the position that he or she 
would have been in had the tort not occurred, to the extent that this can 
be done with money. 
Let me return to my question about the variant on Kingston just 
described. If A burned down B'  s house, why should he not pay for it, 
even though it would have burned down anyway? Shouldn' t corrective 
justice require him to correct the harm he caused, regardless of what else 
might have happened if he had not committed his wrong? The answer 
cannot be that the Rawyards principle is a conceptual implication of the 
concept of compensation, because that is clearly not true. A principle 
that looked to the status quo ante as a baseline of compensation rather 
48. Cf Dillon v.  Twin State Gas & Elec. Co.,  1 63 A .  I l l , 1 14-1 5  (N.H. 1 932). 
49. Livingstone v. Rawyards Coal Co., [ 1 8 80] 5 A.C.  25, 39 (H.L.). John 
Goldberg has suggested that the language in Rawyards might be understood as indirectly 
invoking an historical worsening approach to quantifying damages and notes further that 
many jury instructions refer explicitly to the idea of restoring the plaintiff to the status 
quo ante. See Goldberg, supra note 1 9, at 1 32 1  & n. l 9. I believe that a detailed 
exawJnation of subsequent English cases would bear out the claim that English law is to 
be understood as requiring damages to be assessed counterfactually rather than 
historically, but I acknowledge that in American law there is some disagreement, and 
perhaps equivocation, about this issue. For a statement of an American equivalent of the 
Rawyards principle, see McDougald v. Garber, 536 N.E.2d 372, 374 (N.Y. 1 989) ("The 
goal [of an award of compensatory damages] is to restore the injured party, to the extent 
possible, to the position that would have been occupied had the wrong not occurred.") 
(citation omitted). 
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than to what would have happened had the wrong not occurred is 
perfectly coherent and, indeed, has much to be said for it in a substantive 
sense. The answer also cannot be that to give B compensation for her 
house would be to give her a windfall, because in the absence of a 
justificatory argument for one result or the other, it is just as much a 
windfall for A not to have to pay compensation. 
The Rawyards principle does seem to me to state a generally correct 
understanding of how damages should be awarded in torts, or rather it 
states a first approximation of such an understanding, for there are 
exceptions. What is the basis for saying this? I am by no means 
satisfied with my answer, and I wish I had a better one. The only 
justification that I can offer takes roughly the following form. An award 
of compensatory damages is, in the first instance, supposed to make 
good the historical harm that one party has caused another. But such an 
award is obviously not intended literally to roll back the past. Given that 
impossibility, there are a number of factors that are appropriately taken 
into account in quantifying damages in monetary terms. One of these is 
what we might call "net-worseoffness," which is the difference, as 
ascertained by a counterfactual inquiry, between the plaintiff's current 
circumstances and the circumstances he or she would have been in had 
the wrong not occurred. Given that B'  s house would have burned down 
anyway, so that even though A has caused B harm he has not actually 
left her worse off, it is a reasonable view of what justice requires 
between the parties to say that A does not have to pay for the house. 
Discounting for contingencies would be justified along similar lines. I 
emphasize that this is a substantive and contestable moral judgment, not 
a conceptual truth of any kind. It is also important to see that while net­
worseoffness is a morally relevant factor in the quantification of 
damages, it is only one among others. Thus the Rawyards principle does 
not state a hard and fast rule. Out of an abundance of caution I should 
also emphasize that net-worseoffness is not, for the reasons that were 
given in Parts II and IV, an issue that arises in the determination of 
whether or not there has been harm. It is, rather, a factor to be taken into 
account in the assessment of damages. 
To see why net-worseoffness is only one factor among others in the 
quantification of damages, consider the basic fact situation of Kingston 
again. Two fires joined and burned down the plaintiff's house, where 
either fire alone would have been sufficient to cause that outcome. The 
defendant set one of the fires, whereas the other was of unknown origin. 
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The court said that if the other fire could be shown to be of natural 
origin, A would not have to pay B compensation .  This i s  a clear 
application of the Rawyards principle. But the court then went on to say 
that if, as it assumed was in fact the case,50 the second fire had been 
tortiously set, then both tortfeasors could be held jointly and severally 
liable for the harm. Given that only the one tortfeasor was before the 
court, that person could be held fully liable. The court refused, in other 
words, to apply the Rawyards principle to this set of facts. The injustice 
of allowing a tortfeasor to escape liability by pointing to what another 
tortfeasor had done was held to be of sufficient moral weight to 
overcome the prima facie assumption that A does not have to pay 
compensation for a kind of harm that would have occurred anyway. It is 
very arguable that the same result should be reached when the second 
tortfeasor did not causally contribute to the actual harm, but would have 
caused similar harm had the first tortfeasor not already done so. 
Because the second tortfeasor did not actually cause any harm, he cannot 
be held liable. But it can nonetheless be argued that the first tortfeasor 
should have to pay full compensation because, one way or another, the 
harm the plaintiff was bound to suffer would have been tortiously 
caused, and it would be unjust to let her go uncompensated. And this is 
the result that at least some courts have seen fit to reach. 5 1 
What, then, are we to say of the venerable doomed airplane? Most 
commentators assume that the taxi driver does have to pay compensation, 
and my intuitions run in the same direction. It should be emphasized 
that the case does not raise the Rawyards principle at all; there is no 
question of even trying to put the plaintiff in the position he would have 
been in had the tort not occurred (namely dead). Rather the case raises 
the problem of offset: When, and under what circumstances, should the 
benefits that flow from the defendant' s tortious actions serve to mitigate 
damages? It should also be emphasized that offset, being a question of 
damages, is different from the question of whether the occurrence of 
harm depends on a netting -out effect, and different again from the 
question of whether or not an accompanying benefit justifies a harmful 
action, that is, renders it nonwrongfuP2 The most plausible understanding 
of the limb-splitting rescuer, for example, is that his action was justified 
by the fact that causing the harm avoided an even greater harm, namely 
50. The court reversed the burden of proof on this issue. lt is not obvious that it 
was correct to do so, but that point is not directly relevant to the question currently under 
consideration. 
5 1 .  See, e.g. , B aker v. Willoughby [ 1 970] A. C .  467, 494 (H.L. 1 969). 
52. Shiffiin offers a very interesting discussion of the justification question. See 
Shiffrin, supra note 3, at 1 25-3 1 .  
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death. The question of damages would thus not even arise. 
53 If, in the 
doomed airplane hypothetical, the taxi driver had intentionally injured 
the would-be passenger as the only available means of preventing him 
from getting on the airplane, the issue of justification would have to be 
addressed.54 But that issue clearly does not arise when the driver 
negligently injures the would-be passenger with no inkling that the plane 
is doomed to crash. 
The benefit in the doomed airplane hypothetical is, of course, the 
avoidance of the harm of death . The Restatement says there should be 
offset "to the extent that this is equitable."55 Although not very helpful 
in concrete terms, this nonetheless strikes me as an appropriate way to 
put the point: Offset is another factor that is morally relevant to the 
quantification of damages, but it is one that requires substantive moral 
judgments that may be quite controversial and that may shift from case 
to case. I do not have a knockdown argument one way or another in the 
case of the doomed airplane, but I believe the equities run against 
mitigation because the benefit is too much of a coincidence, and too 
little connected to the defendant 's actual actions, to be appropriately 
treated as an offset. The case is reminiscent in this respect of the 
coincidence cases that arise under the rubric of proximate cause.56 As a 
result of the defendant's negligence, the plaintiff is, say, placed under a 
tree that just happens to fall at the precise moment that he or she is there. 
The coincidence rules out liability in such a case, and my sense is that it 
should similarly rule out offset in the case of the doomed airplane. 57 But 
I concede that one could probably make a respectable argument that 
would come out the other way. 
53 .  This i s  not to say that there can never be  liability for a justified act. See 
Vincent v. Lake Erie Transp. Co. ,  1 24 N.W. 22 1 , 222 (Minn . 1 9 1 0). 
54. Leo Katz discusses this variation of the doomed airplane hypothetical. See 
Katz, supra note 37, at 1 348. 
55 .  RESTATEMENT (SEC OND) OF TORTS § 920 ( 1979). 
56. See, e.g., Berry v. Sugar Notch Borough, 43 A 240 (Pa. 1 899). 
57. At the conference on compensation, some participants dubbed this the "symmetry" 
principle. 
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